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HOW NOT TO SAVE THE PLANET
1
 
 
Thom Brooks 
Durham University 
 
Abstract. Climate change presents us with perhaps the most pressing challenge today. But is 
it a problem we can solve? This article argues that existing conservationist and adaptation 
approaches fail to satisfy their objectives. A second issue that these approaches disagree 
about how best to end climate change, but accept that it is a problem that can be solved. I 
believe this view is mistaken: a future environmental catastrophe is an event we might at best 
postpone, but not avoid. This raises new ethical questions for climate change: what are the 
moral implications of a future climatic catastrophe that might be delayed at best? What 
practical consequences might these implications yield? This article argues most political 
philosophers have misunderstood the kind of problem that climate change presents and the 
daunting challenges we face. 
    
I. Introduction 
Climate change presents us with perhaps the most pressing challenge today. But is it a 
problem we can solve? The ‘orthodox’ view accepted by most political philosophers argues 
                                                 
1
 This essay has been presented at the universities of Boston, Cardiff, Durham, 
Edinburgh, Essex, Groningen, Oxford, Oxford Brookes, and Stirling, the Oxford Political 
Thought Conference and Political Studies Association annual meeting. I am most grateful to 
these audiences and others for helpful comments on earlier drafts, especially Robin Attfield, 
Andrea Baumeister, Richard Bellamy, Gillian Brock, Claire Brooks, Gary Browning, Alan 
Carter, Hugh Compston, James Connolly, Rowan Cruft, Boudewijn de Bruin, Liz Fraser, 
Fabian Freyenhagen, Mathias Frisch, Bruce Haddock, Iain Hampsher-Monk, Nicole Hassoun, 
Clare Heyward, Peter Hulm, Pauline Kleingeld, Joshua Knobe, Melissa Lane, Jonathan 
Lowe, Sandra Marshall, Wayne Martin, Liz McKinnell, David Miller, Margaret Moore, 
Aletta Norval, Jörgen Ödalen, David Owen, Soran Reader, Peri Roberts, David Schlosberg, 
Thomas Schramme, Esther Shubert, Matthew Noah Smith, Suzanne Sreedhar, Daniel Star, 
Martin van Hees, Margaretha Wewerinke, Jo Wolff, Hiro Yamazaki, and Lea Ypi. I am 
especially grateful for comments by anonymous referees. 
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that ending climate change is possible although there is deep disagreement about how it is so. 
I believe this orthodox view is mistaken: a future ice age or other environmental catastrophe 
is an event we might at best postpone, but not avoid. This raises new ethical questions for 
climate change: what are the moral implications of a future climatic catastrophe that might be 
delayed at best? What practical consequences might these implications yield? These concerns 
are too often neglected in favour of defending solutions that fail to solve the serious effects of 
climate change. 
The effects of climate change and its causes are not controversial: there is a global 
consensus that accepts human activity is responsible for climate change and its associated 
dangers.
2
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has made clear that 
‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’: global average sea levels continue to rise 
while mountain glaciers and ice caps regularly decline coupled with an increasing frequency 
of extreme weather events.
3
 Further dangers include the increasing threats to coastal wetlands 
due to rising sea levels, the greater likelihood of droughts affecting agricultural production, 
the spread of tropical diseases to new geographical regions and the more recent phenomena 
of ‘environmental refugees’.4 The climate is changing because of human activities, especially 
                                                 
2
 See Peter T. Doran and Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, ‘Examining the Scientific 
Consensus on Climate Change’, EOS 90 (2009): 286—300. For an exception, see Christopher 
Booker, The Real Global Warming Disaster (London: Continuum 2009). 
3
 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013): 4 (available on the IPCC website: 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf) and IPCC, 
‘2014: Summary for Policymakers’ in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 4—8 (available on the IPCC 
website: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.). 
4
 Pachauri and Reisigner, Climate Change 2007, 33. On environmental refugees, see 
Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan, ‘The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise Due 
to Climate Change’, Ethics and International Affairs 24 (2010): 239—60; Avery Kolers, 
‘Floating Provisos and Sinking Islands’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (2012): 333—43; 
Cara Nine, ‘Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the Lockean Proviso’, Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 27 (2010): 359—75; and Mathias Risse, ‘The Right to Relocation: 
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in the creation of greenhouse gasses such as carbon emissions: it has been at least 420,000 
years that the Earth has had so much carbon dioxide and methane in its atmosphere.
5
 Many 
believe the dangers related to climate change pose the greatest problems for governments 
today.
6
 
 Our challenge is not to consider whether there is climate change, but how best to 
respond to it.
7
 While a global consensus accepts the existence of climate change, there is 
significant disagreement about how best to address this challenge. Mainstream proposals 
generally support one of two competing and overlapping approaches. Both aim to effectively 
overcome the problems associated with climate change to ensure its associated dangers do 
not lead to the planet becoming inhospitable for human beings.
8
 One approach is largely 
conservationist. Its goal is to reduce carbon emissions in order to end further contributing to 
climate change and, thus, better manage associated dangers by decreasing continued climate 
                                                                                                                                                        
Disappearing Island Nations and Common Ownership of the Earth’, Ethics and International 
Affairs 23 (2009): 281—300. 
5
 See Singer, One World, 16. There are many different greenhouse gasses beyond 
carbon emissions, including aerosols and methane. While methane is more potent, it remains 
in the atmosphere for only about 12 years whereas carbon emissions are created in far larger 
quantities by human activity and they may remain up to 200 years in the atmosphere. See 
Stephen Gardiner, ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’, Ethics 114 (2004): 555—600, at 561. 
6
 For example, see Albert Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992); David A. King, ‘Climate Change Science: Adapt, 
Mitigate, or Ignore?’ Science 9 (2004): 176—77; and Martin L. Parry, Nigel W. Arnell, 
Anthony J. McMichael, Robert J. Nicholls, Pim Martens, R. Sari Kovats, Matthew T. J. 
Livermoore, Cynthia Rosenzweig, Ana Iglesias, and Gunther Fischer, ‘Millions at Risk: 
Defining Critical Climate Change Threats and Targets’, Global Environmental Change–
Human and Policy Dimensions (2001): 181—83. 
7
 There are some noteworthy criticisms of IPCC findings. See Ronald Bailey (ed.), 
The True State of the Planet: Ten of the World’s Premier Environmental Researchers in a 
Major Challenge to the Environmental Movement (New York: Free Press, 1995); Bjorn 
Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical 
Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming (New York: Vintage, 2008). 
8
 For alternative views, see Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: 
Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) and James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of Our Living Earth, 2d ed 
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changes.
9
 A second approach is focused more specifically on adaptation strategies where the 
goal is to better adapt ourselves to the environment so we become more effectively protected 
from the associated dangers of climate change. While most proposals incorporate elements of 
both conservation and adaptation, there remains a clear division between these approaches in 
terms of the greater priority different proposals have for one approach over the other 
permitting this classification into broadly two approaches.
10
 
 I critically examine several existing proposals to overcome the problem of climate 
change and argue they are unsatisfactory for new reasons, including that they fail to offer 
satisfactory proposals for future sustainability and lead to additional problems. The following 
three sections consider each approach in turn. I argue these proposals are objectionable 
because they misunderstand the kind of challenge that climate change presents. A clearer 
understanding of this challenge highlights the need to conceive of climate change as a 
problem to be managed and perhaps never solved. The final section of the paper considers the 
possible implications for our theories about climate change justice.  
 
II. Conservation: The Ecological Footprint 
The most common approach to climate change ethics is conservation. Conservationists argue 
that the best way to address climate change and its associated dangers is to remove further 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9
 Carbon emissions are a major part of human activity that contributes to climate 
change, but it is not the only part. I will discuss climate change in relation to carbon 
emissions to help simplify the discussion. My focus is not on whether there is climate change 
and how it is cause, but rather on the question of how best to address climate change if we 
accept the global consensus on its existence and cause. The conservationist approaches 
considered in sections II and III are also understood in terms of mitigation. See Darrel 
Moellendorf, ‘Treaty Norms and Climate Change Mitigation’, Ethics and International 
Affairs 23 (2009): 247—65. 
10
 See Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Polity, 2009): 
13. 
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change in order to end contributions to further dangers.
11
 Conservation proposals differ on 
how best to bring about a reduction in carbon emissions.  
Conservationism is a wide tent encompassing a diversity of policy proposals. I will 
examine the two leading proposals, the ecological footprint and the polluter pays principle. I 
do not claim that all conservationists endorse or should endorse both proposals. My aim is to 
argue that each proposal aims at conservationism and highlight problems each faces at 
achieving its aim.  
 The idea of an ‘ecological footprint’ is one approach to addressing climate change.12 
Our footprint is a measure of human carrying capacity: the maximum rate of resource 
consumption that can be sustained indefinitely.
13
 Every person leaves an ecological footprint. 
The problem is that too often our footprint is much larger than the environment might sustain. 
We should ensure that our environmental impact does not collectively threaten carrying 
capacity. The ecological footprint strategy is a conservationist approach because it entails real 
reductions in human consumption, including carbon emissions. The ecological footprint 
                                                 
11
 This approach is often understood as ‘mitigation’ because it aims to provide 
policies enabling the mitigation of environmental impact by humans. Mitigation may take 
several forms and my focus is on strategies that aim to mitigate environmental impact 
through conservationist measures. My use of ‘conservation’ is meant to single-out this focus 
on distinctive approaches to mitigation. 
12
 See Jeroen C. J. M. Van den Bergh and Harmen Verbruggen, ‘Spatial 
Sustainability, Trade, Trade, and Indicators: An Evalutaion of the “Ecological Footprint”’, 
Ecological Economics 29 (1999): 63—74; Steve Vanderheiden, ‘Two Conceptions of 
Sustainability’, Political Studies 56 (2008): 435—55; Mathis Wackernagel and William E. 
Rees, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth (Gabriola Island: 
New Society Publishers, 1996); Mathis Wackernagel and William E. Rees, ‘Perceptual and 
Structural Barriers to Investing in Natural Capital: Economics from an Ecological Footprint 
Perspective’, Ecological Economics 20 (1997): 3—24. The World Wildlife Fund has an 
online footprint calculator here: http://footprint.wwf.org.uk/.) 
13
 See William E. Rees, ‘Ecological Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capacity: 
What Urban Economics Leaves Out’, Environment and Urbanization 4 (1992): 121—30, esp. 
125. See also Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008): 184 and Arjen Y. Hoekstra and Mesfin M. Mekonnen, “The Water Footprint of 
Humanity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 109: 3232—37. 
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approach is also egalitarian. Each person must live within an equal ecological footprint. The 
footprint is no bigger than can guarantee human sustainability if each person had an equal 
size. Therefore, we are not permitted to consume and pollute more than others. We share 
global conservation equally.
14
 
 A second method of determining our ecological footprint considers equal shares to the 
absorption capacity of our atmosphere’s sink.15 The atmosphere’s sink belongs to all in 
common. If some were to use more than their fair share, then others would be deprived of 
their fair shares. We have a duty to each other against using more than our fair shares and we 
may owe others compensation where we neglect this duty.
16
 The idea is that we can guarantee 
sustainability by ensuring all emissions are absorbed within the atmosphere’s sink. We each 
have an equal share in the use of the global sink and this will require major emission 
reductions.
17
 
 There is much evidence to suggest that the populations in some countries are living 
beyond the limits of their ecological footprints. For example, measuring world carbon 
emissions between 1950 to 1986 revealed that ‘the United States, with about 5 percent of the 
world’s population at that time, was responsible for 30 percent of the cumulative emissions, 
whereas India, with 17 percent of the world’s population, was responsible for less than 2 
percent of the emissions’.18 The idea of an ecological footprint appears to be a helpful device 
                                                 
14
 This idea is related to the idea of ecological debt. We may owe others an ecological 
debt whenever we live beyond our ecological footprint. See Simms, Ecological Debt, 88. 
15
 See Singer, One World, 28 and Martino Traxler, ‘Fair Chore Division for Climate 
Change’, Social Theory and Practice 28 (2002): 101—34. 
16
 I will discuss the problems of compensation and environmental goods in the 
following section. 
17
 There is a difference between ecological footprints and equal shares in the global 
atmospheric sink. Ecological footprints are a wider measure of impact on global ecology, 
while equal shares of the atmospheric sink is focused particularly on atmospheric gases, 
especially carbon emissions. 
18
 Singer, One World, 32. 
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in addressing issues pertaining to climate change. Some argue that climate change is an 
example of ‘the tragedy of the commons’.19 When different people have access to an 
unregulated good, their individual actions may lead to decidedly less than optimal overall 
outcomes. The idea of an ecological footprint is believed to help correct this tragedy. 
 An important motivation for why we should adopt conservationist measures, such as 
the ecological footprint, is because failing to so would make us responsible for harming 
others.
20
 The idea of harm is a complex subject that lacks any simple definition and I will 
only offer general remarks. Conservationists often focus on our collective responsibility for 
contributing to environmental damage and not mere environmental change. Plant and animal 
species may adapt and evolve because of environmental change and this need not confirm 
environmental damage: environmental change is not always environmental damage.
21
 
Instead, environmental damage entails ecological changes that may be detrimental to plant 
and animal species. Such changes endanger their continued flourishing, including the risk of 
extinction. Conservationists understand harm to the environment as a detrimental change to 
plant and animal species that endanger their continued flourishing for which human beings 
are responsible.
22
 This harm is further understood to have potential detrimental effects upon 
                                                 
19
 See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 162 (1968): 1243—48 
and Christopher Knapp, ‘Tragedies without Commons’, Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (2011): 
81—94. 
20
 This is one important motivation for many conservationists, but not the only 
motivation. See Peter Singer, ‘One Atmosphere’ in One World: The Ethics of Globalization, 
2
nd
 ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004): 14—50. 
21
 It is not the presence of carbon emissions or other greenhouse gases that is the 
problem. Indeed, there is already ‘a purely natural greenhouse effect’ responsible for a 
warmer surface temperature. John Houghton argues that the Earth’s surface temperature is 
15ºC instead of -6ºC. See Gardiner, ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’, 557—58 and John 
Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997): 11—12. 
22
 I do not suggest that this is the only nor the primary understanding of harm held by 
conservationists. Other understandings might include any damage to our aesthetic experience 
of nature. See Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, 158—62. 
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future generations, a complex topic with its own literature that I will bracket for this 
discussion.
23
 
 The ecological footprint approach to conservation has several limitations. The first is 
that it is an anthropocentric approach.
24
 The ecological footprint is a determination of the 
carrying capacity of human beings. We measure the impact of our activities upon the 
environment; we do not have regard to the environmental impact of plant and animal species. 
This anthropocentric perspective may be helpful in planning a sustainable future for 
humanity. The problem remains that the sustainable carrying capacity of human activities 
may not be coextensive with the sustainable carrying capacity for non-humans. The 
ecological footprint may lead to a future of sustainable human activities, but this may not 
include continued flourishing of the natural world. If human sustainability can be guaranteed 
at the cost of nature’s diminished flourishing, then the ecological footprint is an approach that 
might better ensure the conservation of human beings at the cost of conserving nature.
25
 
 A second limitation concerns equality and fairness. The ecological footprint is thought 
                                                 
23
 One compelling approach to thinking about harm, future generations, and the non-
identity problem is offered by Joseph Mazor. He argues that present persons have justice-
based obligations to each other to conserve natural resources for future generations where 
these generations as understood as ‘a chain of overlapping generations’ rather than monoliths. 
See Joseph Mazor, ‘Liberal Justice, Future People, and Natural Resource Conservation’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (2010): 380—408 and Edward A. Page, Climate Change, 
Justice, and Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006). On the non-identity 
problem more generally, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984): 351—80. 
24
 On anthropocentrism and climate change ethics more generally, see Nicole 
Hassoun, ‘The Anthropocentric Advantage? Environmental Ethics and Climate Change 
Policy’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (2011): 235—57. 
25
 This position does not deny that we are ‘trustees of the planet’. (See Robin Attfield, 
The Ethics of the Global Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999): 45.) 
Moreover, we may prefer to favour ourselves over the natural world. My claim is not that this 
is a view we should reject, but rather that the ecological footprint treats the natural 
environment as secondary, or perhaps as instrumental, to human sustainability. My thanks to 
Matthew Noah Smith for raising this issue. 
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to treat all persons on an equal and fair footing.
26
 We are each to live within the bounds of 
our ecological footprint to ensure a sustainable future and this footprint is uniformly equal for 
all. One worry is that footprints of equal sizes may not be fair. This is because my fair use of 
the environment in terms of my satisfactory nourishment and bodily needs may differ from 
others. Childbirth and old age may require a greater need for a larger footprint. Additionally, 
persons with different heights and body mass may have differences in resource needs. There 
are also potential gender differences in resource needs pertaining to pregnancy. So there is no 
‘one size fits all’ ecological footprint we may apply to everyone nor is there any single, fixed 
footprint for any individual as our footprint may change over our life as we change. If we 
were able to account for individual differences between persons over a life, then the fair 
solution may not be to agree an equal size ecological footprint. This is because there is the 
further problem of resource needs in relation to natural climate. Persons living in some 
climates will have different resource needs than others. Determining fair ecological footprints 
may often entail unequal sizes to accommodate these differences. 
 Ecological footprints may also be unfair. Societies have developed differently in 
relation to their wealth and technological advances. Suppose that we agreed a uniform 
average of the ecological footprint and that each society had a footprint equal to this average 
multiplied by the relevant population. This equal distribution could lead to greater unfairness 
in ossifying the relative positions of the wealthy and technological advanced versus the more 
poor and less technologically developed. More wealthy and technologically advanced 
                                                 
26
 See Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A 
Case of Environmental Colonialism (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1991); 
Paul Baer, ‘Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources’, in Stephen 
H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, and John O. Niles (eds), Climate Change Policy: A Survey 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002): 393—408; and Dale Jamieson, ‘The Epistemology of 
Climate Change: Some Morals for Managers’, Society and Natural Resources 4 (1991): 
319—29. 
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societies would be in a much better position to make the most from their limited footprint.
27
 
This would permit them to better retain their position of global privilege over less capable 
societies.
28
 The ecological footprint would not treat persons equally or fairly. 
 There is also the problem of overpopulation. The ecological footprint is an indication 
of sustainable ecological space. Overpopulation would make it impossible for all to live 
within an ecological footprint of equal size. This is because their footprints would point 
beyond sustainability when taken together. Ecological footprints require the absence of 
overpopulation and assume there is sufficient sustainable ecological space for all.
29
 
 A final conservationist proposal is carbon trading.
30
 The idea is that each country 
                                                 
27
 See Tim Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005): 198. 
28
 See Vanderheiden, ‘Two Conceptions of Sustainability’, 446—47. 
29
 The size of our ecological footprint would increase with a decrease in human 
population. This might offer unjust regimes a perverse reason to attack civilians elsewhere in 
order to expand the size of their footprints—and the footprints of all. 
30
 See Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, ‘Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and 
Ineffective?’ Philosophy 69 (2011): 201—34; Cameron Hepburn, ‘Carbon Trading: A 
Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms’, Annual Review of Environmental Resources 32 (2007): 
375—93; Cameron Hepburn and Nicholas Stern, ‘The Global Deal on Climate Change’ in 
Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (eds), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 36—57, esp. 49—53 J. Kurtzman, ‘The Low 
Carbon Diet’, Foreign Policy 88 (2009): 114—22; M. Lazarowicz, Global Carbon Trading: 
A Framework for Reducing Emissions (London: TSO, 2009); Edward A. Page, 
‘Cosmopolitanism, Climate Change, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’, International 
Theory 3 (2011): 37—69; Edward A. Page, ‘Cashing in on Climate Change: Political Theory 
and Global Emissions Trading’, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 14 (2011): 1—15; C. M. Rose, ‘Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: 
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property 
Regimes’, Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 10 (2000): 45—72, at 52—68; Mark 
Sagoff, ‘Controlling Global Climate: The Debate Over Pollution Trading’, in V. V. Gehring 
and W. A. Galston (eds), Philosophical Dimensions of Public Policy (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002): 311—18; R. N. Stavins, ‘Addressing Climate Change with a 
Comprehensive US Cap-and-Trade System’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (2008): 
298—321; and T. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice, 2d ed 
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2006): 25—47, 192—203. While carbon trading 
can be understood as part of a conservationist approach, I do not argue or recommend that all 
conservationists are or should be supporters of carbon trading. I noted at the beginning of this 
section that conservationism is a large tent encompassing a diverse variety of proposals: 
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possesses shares in carbon emissions. None can produce more carbon emissions than they 
have shares for. States may purchase emissions credits from others to permissibly produce 
additional carbon emissions. This has many potential benefits including making it easier for 
states with higher carbon emissions to bring these more gradually to lower levels.  
 The primary limitation is that carbon trading may produce a negative effect on our 
motivations to conserve.
31
 Conservationists believe we should conserve to best address the 
associated dangers of climate change. Therefore, we should not contribute to climate change. 
Carbon trading does not ensure that each state becomes more sustainable. Instead, it is a 
mechanism to guarantee better that the global system taken as a whole may become more 
sustainable. Sufficiently wealthy citizens who can purchase carbon credits may continue to 
produce increasing emissions than citizens elsewhere. The wealthy few may enjoy greater 
resource use and material luxuries at the expense of a majority left with much less.
32
 The 
problem is that the wealthy few are also the largest polluters. Carbon trading may not offer 
sufficiently attractive incentives to pollute less. Instead, it might lead to ossifying the global 
status quo.
33
 
 The ecological footprint is an unsatisfactory solution as currently defended to how we 
might best address the associated dangers of climate change. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
carbon trading is part of this diversity. 
31
 See Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003): 2—3 and Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, ‘Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be 
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?’ California Law Review 97 (2009): 51—93. 
32
 See Henry Shue, ‘Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions’, Law and Policy 
15 (1993): 39—59. 
33
 My view is similar to Posner and Sunstein’s argument that carbon trading lacks 
sufficiently attractive incentives for major polluters, such as the United States, to pollute less. 
My concern goes further: my worry is that not only scepticism about the effectiveness of 
carbon trading for reducing carbon emissions to the levels required for sustainability, but that 
the system is likely to return unequal benefits in favour of the affluent and technologically 
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III. Conservation: The polluter pays principle 
The polluter pays principle is an alternative conservationist approach to the ecological 
footprint.
34
 The principle is built upon the premise that we have a negative duty to 
compensate others for the harm we have caused. Polluters should compensate others for their 
carbon emissions. Their compensation ought to minimize, if not annul, environmental 
damage relating to these emissions. 
 The polluter pays principle entails considerations of harm, compensation, and its 
conservationist potential. We have already noted the difficulty of identifying harm above. 
The idea of compensation is similarly complex. First, we may be tempted to understand the 
polluter pays principle as a compensation principle. The polluter ought to pay because she 
should compensate. The notion that polluters should compensate rather than merely pay 
better invokes the idea that they are addressing a wrong. This highlights the important 
difference between a fine and a fee.
35
 A fine similarly invokes a wrong whereas a fee does 
not. This is one reason to understand what the polluter should pay as a fine. Moreover, the 
idea of a fine might better contribute to a sense of common responsibility relating to climate 
change. 
                                                                                                                                                        
advanced against the more poor and less technologically able.  
34
 See Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate 
Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law 18 (2005): 747—75; S. Gaines, ‘The Polluter-
Pays Principle : From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos’, Texas International Law 
Journal 26 (1991): 463—95; Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, 92; Eric Neumayer, 
‘In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, Ecological 
Economics 33 (2000): 185—92; and Henry Shue, ‘Global Environment and International 
Inequality’, International Affairs 75 (1999): 533—37. My argument is that the 
conservationist approach is inclusive of a diversity of proposals on how conservationism 
might be achieved and this includes the polluter pays principle and ecological footprint 
amongst many others. I do not claim that all conservationists endorse one or the other, but 
instead that each is a conservationist proposal and that they are among the most popular 
conservationist proposals.  
35
 See Michael Sandel, ‘Should We Buy the Right to Pollute?’ in Public Philosophy: 
Essays on Morality in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005): 93—96. 
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 Secondly, it is far from clear whether we can compensate environmental damage.
36
 
Should it be permissible to provide compensation for making a species extinct? And what if 
others reject an offer of compensation? The polluter pays principle assumes we can 
compensate for environmental damage.
37
 The principle further assumes that compensation is 
unproblematic and it would be widely acceptable. These assumptions presume too much. 
Environmental goods, such as a specie’s existence, may not be compensatory goods and we 
cannot assume all environmental impacts have a discernible monetary cost. Likewise, it 
remains unclear why we should in principle permit compensation from others to address our 
being subjected to their environmental damage.  
 There are further limitations with this approach. One is the problem of determining 
the identity of polluters. We are all the polluters and the victims of pollution. So who pays 
whom?
38
 A common view is to claim that the relevant agents are states with collective 
responsibilities.
39
 This raises issues of whether current generations should compensate for the 
policies of previous generations that have led to climate change, or what we might call 
‘environmental reparations’. This issue is thorny although some believe the problem less 
vexing. For example, James Garvey says: ‘It is a straightforward fact that some countries 
have emitted more greenhouse gases–used up more of the planet’s sinks, caused more climate 
change–than others. It’s a quantifiable fact: we know something about cumulative 
                                                 
36
 My thanks to Melissa Lane for highlighting this important problem. 
37
 It could be argued that the problem is the principle is too strong: instead of claiming 
we can and should compensate in full for any environmental damage, it should defend our 
compensating as best as is possible, or ‘partial compensation’ (and not ‘full compensation’). 
But the general problem does not go away: if environmental goods are non-compensatory 
goods, then adopting a position of full or partial compensation is inadequate. 
38
 See Paul Baer, ‘Adaptation: Who Pays Whom’, in Neil Adger, et al (eds), Fairness 
in Adaptation to Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006): 131—54. 
39
 See Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, 
755. On the problem with states and responsibility, see Onora O’Neill, ‘Agents of Justice’, 
Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 180—95. 
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emissions’.40 If this were true, then there would remain the issue of cut-off points: how far 
back should we go to assess past emissions? Our data on cumulative emissions does not go 
back very far. We must have some satisfactory rationale for potentially penalizing states on 
account of their carbon emissions over such an arbitrary time period. 
 A second limitation is determining how much a polluter should pay. We are 
witnessing the associated dangers of climate change today. This gives us reason to act. 
However, current climate change is a result of earlier practices by past generations. How 
much we should pay must address this historical dimension. Nicholas Stern argues that 
greenhouse gas emissions are an example of ‘the greatest market failure the world has ever 
seen’.41 This is because the prices of goods, such as petrol, do not reflect the true costs to 
society of their production and use. The polluter pays principle focuses on consumption, but 
not production which is a mistake: we should focus on both.
42
 Polluters who create carbon 
emissions through their oil consumption share responsibility for the full cost of pollution with 
the oil refineries who produce oil for the market, for example. So if we argue that creating 
carbon emissions may entail having to pay for the pollution, then we should recognize that 
carbon emissions arise with production and consumption.
43
 Both must be reflected in 
calculating how much we should pay. 
 A final limitation is that the polluter pays principle does not guarantee environmental 
conservation. One reason is that some proposals take the form of a tax on oil consumption. 
                                                 
40
 James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming 
World (London: Continuum, 2008): 115. 
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 Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, 11. 
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 See Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, 159. 
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 Note that the polluter pays principle can apply to cases beyond oil consumption. 
The issue is not whether pollution is carbon-based per se, but rather whether the pollution 
contributes to some environmental harm such as climate change and its potentially harmful 
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pays principle to consider. 
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The idea is that higher oil costs will lead to a sustainable amount of carbon emissions. While 
higher costs are associated with less emissions, there is no evidence to suggest that they will 
drop sufficiently low.
44
 A second reason is that the polluter can pollute as much as he can pay 
for. If polluters are assumed able to pay for the environmental costs from their emissions, 
then global carbon emissions may rise where polluters have the ability to pay. 
 Some polluter pays principle advocates are sensitive to these objections. For example, 
Simon Caney argues that we are all under a duty not to exceed our quota for greenhouse gas 
emissions.
45
 Global emissions must be capped. Polluters should still pay when producing 
carbon emissions because we have a duty to compensate others through mitigation or 
adaptation. The resources raised through a polluter pays scheme could contribute to 
conservation. The problem is that the principle loses its motivational force. A negative duty 
to compensate for potential risk of environmental harm may be more compelling than a 
positive duty to compensate despite the absence of risk. If global emissions were capped to 
ensure conservation, then polluters would not need to compensate others for any harm 
because none would arise within the global emissions cap. The polluter pays principle is 
reduced to a positive duty with the aim of generating resources to assist conservation rather 
than a negative duty aim to compensate for harm. The problem is that the claim for polluters 
paying others is founded on the idea that polluters harm others by polluting. If emissions are 
capped so that no polluter harms others by polluting, then it becomes unclear why polluters 
have a duty to compensate others because they would not have a negative duty to do so. 
 The polluter pays principle is an unsatisfactory solution to how we might best address 
                                                 
44
 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2011 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011): 6-7 (available online 
here: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/emissions.cfm/.) 
45
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the associated dangers of climate change. 
 
IV. Adaptation 
Adaptation is the leading alternative approach to conservation. It is important to note that 
adaptation is widely understood to be a reality, not an option.
46
 Most conservationists accept 
that climate change policy must incorporate adaptation because any mitigation through 
conservation ‘will not be enough’.47 For example, Stephen Gardiner argues: 
 
The first thing to note . . . is that adaptation measures will clearly need to be part of 
any sensible climate policy, because we are already committed to some warming due 
to past emissions, and almost all of the proposed abatement strategies envisage that 
overall global emissions will continue to rise for at least the next few decades, 
committing us to even more.
48
 
 
Adaptation may play an important role in formulating climate change policy along with some 
reduction in carbon emissions. The question is whether adaptation is an appropriate primary 
solution to the problem of climate change rather than conservation. 
 Adaptation advocates share several views in common. The first is less certainty that 
major reductions in carbon emissions are necessary: ‘we will save ourselves by adapting to 
our ever-changing circumstances . . . At the end of the day, the story will have a happy 
                                                 
46
 See Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, 161: ‘Whatever happens from now on, 
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Failed—and What It Means for Our Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
47
 See Michael D. Mastrandrea and Stephen H. Schneider, Preparing for Climate 
Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010): 13. 
48
 Gardiner, ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’, 573. 
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ending’.49 While there is no doubt that climate change is taking place, there is greater 
certainty that we can effectively adapt to the changing conditions we will face in future.
50
 
Major adaptation efforts, such as greater urbanization and reliance on genetically modified 
foods and nuclear energy, can provide a satisfactory solution.
51
 
 One reason why we should focus more on adaptation rather than conservation is 
because the former is a more cost-effective approach, or so adaptation advocate argue. For 
example, Bjorn Lomborg says: ‘it will be far more expensive to cut CO2 emissions radically 
than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased temperatures’.52  Conservationist 
approaches are estimated to cost about 2% of GDP per annum (or roughly $1 trillion per 
annum).
53
 Our resources are better spent adapting ourselves to climate change and spending 
our savings on other major social issues, such as poverty alleviation.
54
 We should reduce 
emissions to a level of sustainable adaptability, this will cost less than reducing emissions 
levels to a sustainable level not requiring adaptation measures, and the savings may be used 
to do more good for the global poor than mere protection from the associated dangers of 
climate change.
55
 
 Adaptation measures may take several forms. The potential threats to coastal 
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2010). 
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53
 See Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, 54. 
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 See Lomborg, Cool It, 8, 35. 
55
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communities from rising sea water may be addressed through building better flood defenses 
or relocation. Climate change will see land become more arid and less agriculturally 
productive. We may address this problem through the greater use of genetically modified 
crops that may better thrive than traditional crops. Tropical diseases spreading to new 
geographical areas might be approached through inoculation measures. These measures can 
provide us with a sustainable future without engaging in costly major emissions reductions. 
 These measures are understood anthropocentrically.
56
 So we speak of relocating 
human communities or genetic modified food to feed human beings. There is little 
consideration of how the natural world might be better adapted to ensure continued 
flourishing. Adaptation is primarily about how we might best adapt to climate change. There 
is less concern about how plant and animal species may be affected by climate change than 
found with conservationist approaches in general.
57
 
 The adaptation approach has several limitations that relate to its overconfidence in our 
ability to successfully adapt. One limitation is future uncertainty about the environment.
58
 
What future must we adapt to? We must especially have a clearer conception about a future 
of adaptation rather than conservation. While there are models of likely effects from climate 
change in our near future, these models become far more speculative the further ahead we 
look. Adaptation is a strategy for a future world about which we lack sufficient clarity and 
                                                                                                                                                        
148-71. 
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58
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certainty. 
 A second limitation is future uncertainty about the likely success of adaptation 
measures. Suppose we could have confidence in models of future environmental conditions 
should we choose adaptation over conservation. The problem is that we cannot safely test 
proposals in the way that many biologists or chemists may conduct experiments in a 
controlled laboratory. Any measures would have some real degree of uncertainty of success 
beyond an acceptable level given the very high costs of failure. Indeed, many proposed 
adaptation measures have either not been tried or do not yet exist.
59
 For example, some argue 
in favour of ‘carbon capture’ where carbon is removed from the atmosphere and pumped into 
depleted oil fields deep underwater.
60
 The problem is that the future risk to human and marine 
life is unknown with potentially deadly consequences for both.
61
 
 Many have put great faith in technology to help address climate change: ‘In a world 
with billions of educated, ambitious individuals, the best adaptations and innovations will be 
pretty good’.62 Its popularity lies in its being a ‘cheap and simple’ solution.63 Dale Jamieson 
says: 
 
Technological approaches are popular both with politicians and with the public 
because they promise solutions to environmental problems without forcing us to 
change our values, ways of life, or economic systems . . . the image of the scientist as 
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Be?’ Science 325 (2009): 1647—52. 
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the “can-do” guy who can solve any problem remains quite potent.64 
 
Cheap solutions that will leave our daily lives largely unchanged are an attractive option.
65
 
 The problem is that too often technological advances producing energy savings have 
been counterproductive.
66
 For example, it is argued: 
 
More power-efficient washing machines or better insulated houses will help the 
environment; but they also cut our bills, and that immediately means we lose some of 
the environmental gain by spending the saved money on something else. As cars have 
become more fuel-efficient we have chosen to drive further. As houses have become 
better insulated we have raised standards of heating, and as we put in energy-saving 
light bulbs the chances are that we start to think it doesn’t matter so much leaving 
them on.
67
 
 
Energy efficiencies have not led to the carbon emission reductions they promised. If 
adaptation were to be a primary aim of climate change policy, then we require higher 
confidence that technological advances would lead to greater reductions rather than result in 
counterproductive behaviour. 
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 This brings us to the understanding of relevant risks. Adaptation proponents are less 
risk averse than conservationists. If no measures whether adaptive or conservationist are 
taken, then there is a genuine risk of our reaching dangerous tipping points and 
environmental catastrophe. Not only do adaptation proponents believe it possible to 
satisfactorily adapt, but they also have greater scepticism about the likely danger of reaching 
tipping points in the foreseeable future.  
This is perhaps more than an interpretive debate over the role of the precautionary 
principle because of the size of the relevant risks.
68
 Adaptation may succeed for the present, 
but be reckless as a long-term policy. Furthermore, the adaptation approach has a more casual 
concern about the moral permissibility of exposing the environment to greater risk than 
conservation. All living things require resources and impact the environment. The question is 
whether it is morally permissible to expose higher than necessary risks where it might be 
avoided. Adaptation proponents must argue more persuasively for why these risks are 
morally permissible and not merely more cost effective.
69
 
 Adaptation is an important aspect of any climate change policy. The climate is already 
changing and we must change with it. The problem is whether this policy should primarily 
focus on adaptation instead of conservation. There are many reasons to doubt that any such 
policy can proceed or would be wise. There is too much faith on untested and unknown 
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technologies that may have counterproductive outcomes in an uncertain future. The need for 
adaptative technologies is compelling as part of a broader strategy, but it cannot serve as the 
primary focus. 
 Adaptation is an unsatisfactory solution to how we might best address the associated 
dangers of climate change.  
 
V. Climate Change and Catastrophe 
Our challenge is not to determine whether there is climate change or its associated dangers, 
but rather how best to respond to it. This challenge does not admit of ready answers as the 
issue is complex and difficult. Much of my discussion above has focused on where different 
approaches have proven unsatisfactory. While most commentators endorse some combination 
of conservationist and adaptation measures, their proposals usually emphasize either 
conservationism or adaptation. I have argued that neither conservationist proposals such as 
the ecological footprint or the polluter pays principle nor adaptation strategies are convincing 
individual solutions to the problem of climate change.
70
 
 These strategies share in a common mistake concerning the nature of the central 
problem. Both conservation and adaptation proponents claim their approach provides a 
solution to the problems associated with climate change.
71
 Conservationists argue that 
adopting a policy based around ecological footprints or a polluter pays principle will lead to a 
sustainable future. Adaptation proponents claim we should focus our efforts on adapting to 
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future climate change along with modest reductions in carbon emissions to ensure a 
sustainable future and even ‘a happy ending’72. Both approaches aim to offer what we might 
call an end-state solution to the problem of climate change: ‘The world now has the 
technologies and financial resources to stabilize climate’.73 The possibility of permanently 
ending climate change is conceived as an achievable end-state—if only governments 
followed the correct approach, then the problems arising from climate change could be solved 
permanently.
74
  
 This orthodox view is a mistake because there is likely no happy ever after. It is false 
to believe that only human activity influences climatic change, but it is also incorrect to claim 
that human activity might end it. The problem is that we cannot stop the climate from 
changing any more than we can the world from turning. Our climate will change regardless of 
our efforts and it has changed many times before human beings first evolved. So the problem 
is not that the climate is changing, but rather that it is changing so quickly making its 
management especially difficult and complex. End-state solutions to the problem of climate 
change may be doomed to fail from the start. Environmental catastrophe is not something to 
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be avoided, but rather an event at best postponed. So the issue is that not only might 
conservationist and adaptation proposals not yield the solutions they promise to the problem 
they address, but that they are also mistaken about the problem itself. 
 Does this ultimately hand victory to the strategy of adaptation or skeptics? No, it does 
not. The fact that our climate will change is not a compelling reason to exacerbate the arrival 
of unknown future conditions with potentially catastrophic consequences and our doing 
nothing will only make the situation much worse. Nor might the fact that a future ice age or 
other environmental catastrophe is unavoidable support our ending measures to reduce 
current and future environmental damage alongside improving our adaptability to changing 
conditions.
75
 
Instead, we might approach climate change from a new perspective. Our focus should 
not only be on how we might reduce our environmental impact, but we should extend our 
focus to another question: what are the normative implications of a future environmental 
catastrophe both foreseeable and perhaps inevitable? This different focus reinterprets climate 
change as a problem of management where we approach these questions in a new way. Our 
proposals should reconsider sustainability for a tragic world—our tragic world—where the 
choices we have are less clear cut and more sobering than the overly, and unrealistically, 
optimistic solutions already offered. 
The fact of a foreseeable, and perhaps inevitable, climatic catastrophe expands our 
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normative horizons. Suppose an environmental catastrophe is avoidable if all persons adopted 
a particular policy, such as living within an ecological footprint. The motivation for 
supporting this policy is its guarantee of avoiding catastrophe and its devastating 
consequences. We can assess the relative costs and benefits of adopting or rejecting this 
proposal against others in light of this guarantee. Our debates may centre on the certainty of 
this guarantee and its general advantages relating to alternative policies, such as pursuing an 
approach emphasizing adaptability.  
Now suppose an environmental catastrophe is not avoidable irrespective of whichever 
policy is adopted. The motivation for supporting a particular approach cannot be its guarantee 
of avoiding catastrophe. Determining the relative costs and benefits of our possible actions 
becomes more complex because our timescale is longer: it is not a matter of now and the 
permanently sustainable point in future, but a future of changing conditions. 
This analysis rests on the view that radical climate change leading to catastrophe is 
inevitable. It might be objected that the climate might have fluctuated in the past, but it is not 
obvious that it must continue to do in future. And even if it were to do so we might think it 
possible that human beings could obtain the ability to control it.  
This challenge is unsuccessful because there is much less evidence to support the 
view no future environmental catastrophe is likely or within our likely future abilities to 
avoid. It is more science fiction than fact that we will be able to control the global 
environment with any confidence in the foreseeable future. Scientists may not be divided 
about whether the climate is changing, but there are serious divisions about its scale and even 
its nature.
76
 For example, there is widespread debate about the most promising model for 
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capturing climate change.
77
 Climate scientists accept cyclical climatic changes, but there is no 
clearly dominant view about their causes.
78
 As one scientist puts it, ‘many aspects of ice-age 
dynamics remain a mystery’.79 In summary, we might know more about how to destroy our 
planet—through triggering environmental catastrophes or nuclear warfare—than how it 
might be preserved, or save it from ourselves. If so, it should be more compelling to consider 
any proposal concerning climate change in light of our relatively limited knowledge about 
how climatic cycles work beyond that they exist and likely to evade our efforts to control 
them. 
A second potential criticism is that even if the climate does change radically, it need 
not entail catastrophe. This is because human beings might become able to adapt—or at least 
more capable of adapting—in future whether through technological advances or perhaps 
escaping the planet altogether.  
This criticism stems from the adaptation approach which argues it can and should be 
possible to adapt to future climate change. I criticized earlier the view that we might adapt to 
future climate change because it claims we can avoid catastrophe through scientific advances 
that have not been made. Instead, it is a kind of faith in unknown future technology to solve a 
known future problem. However unlikely, it is at least theoretically possible that sufficient 
scientific advances might render radical climate change less dangerous for human beings 
long-term. It might even be urgent that we invest much more in adaptation technologies to 
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better manage short-term likely consequences of climate change. But even if so, then our 
viewing adaptability in light of changing future climatic conditions is different from the 
position held today by adaptation proponents where the future is more constant and 
manageable.  
A final possible criticism concerns practical implications. So if I am correct and a 
future environmental catastrophe is foreseeable and likely unavoidable, then what should we 
do now that we are not doing already? One answer is reducing environmental impact through 
measures such as conservation may be insufficient. Some investment in adaptation is not only 
rendered necessary because of the climate change already underway, but because it is 
inevitable given the likelihood of future climate change even if humans left no ecological 
footprint. Reducing our impact through conservation may be one important, if not the most 
important, means to delay a future environmental catastrophe for as long as possible. 
However, conservation is not and cannot be sufficient on its own. We require some degree of 
adaptation, too. 
The conservation and adaptation measures we should consider may be larger than 
thought. This is because our option is not what we can do to permanently avoid a future 
environmental catastrophe, but how we might best endure it. One part of the answer might be 
to promote conservation as a means to delaying any such future event and so providing more 
time for achieving satisfactory scientific advances. But the difference is that while most 
political philosophers have conceived this as a problem that can be solved and so avoided, 
they have failed to see that even the major changes required to substantially reduce human 
environmental impact globally is not the full picture of what may be required to endure 
radical climatic change. There is no short-term fix or single solution to this problem that is 
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perhaps more permanent and more pressing than understood previously. Following Jamieson, 
we should heed his warning: ‘do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good’.80 The 
importance of conservationist and adaptation strategies does not disappear because they 
might only manage and not solve the problem of avoiding environmental catastrophe through 
climate change. Their disappearance might only make a bad situation worse.
81
 My point is 
that these approaches should be considered in a new light. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Climate change is an issue of great importance. Philosophers have developed contributions 
that aim to address climate change, but they run into two serious concerns. The first is that 
their proposals might not lead to the conclusions they claim. Most of this article focuses on 
this concern. A second, related problem is that many philosophers are mistaken about the 
problem they aim to address. They believe a sustainable future is an end-state and our 
primary focus for discussions about climate change. I have argued this view is mistaken. Both 
proponents of conservation and adaptation defend proposals built around climate change as a 
problem that can be solved. I have argued this and this raises new questions about how it is 
understood. This is not where our discussion ends, but instead only where it should begin. If 
the climate may continually change, then we must change with it and in light of the real 
future possibility of environmental catastrophe no matter our efforts to avoid it. This is the 
daunting challenge we face.  
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